Abstract. In this paper we extend the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem in order to deal with more general access structures. Aspects like verifiability, secret sharing homomorphisms and multiplicative properties are also discussed.
Introduction and Preliminaries
A secret sharing scheme starts with a secret and then derives from it certain shares (shadows). The secret may be recovered only in the case of possessing a certain predetermined set of shares. The initial applications of secret sharing were safeguarding cryptographic keys and providing shared access to strategical resources. Threshold cryptography (see, for example, [10] ) and some e-voting schemes (see, for example, [9] ) are more recent applications of the secret sharing schemes.
In the first secret sharing schemes only the cardinality of the sets of shares was important for recovering the secret. Such schemes have been referred to as threshold secret sharing schemes. We mention Shamir's threshold secret sharing scheme [30] based on polynomial interpolation, Blakley's geometric threshold secret sharing scheme [5] , Mignotte's threshold secret sharing scheme [22] and Asmuth-Bloom threshold secret sharing scheme [1] , both based on the Chinese remainder theorem. Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [21] , Benaloh and Leichter [3] give constructions for more general secret sharing schemes. This paper extends the threshold schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem in order to address more general access structures and presents some interesting capabilities of these schemes like verifiability, secret sharing homomorphisms and multiplicative properties.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of this section is dedicated to some preliminaries on number theory, focusing on the Chinese remainder theorem, and secret sharing schemes. We survey the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem in Section 2 and the general secret sharing techniques in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the threshold secret schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem to more general access structures. In the next section we discuss aspects like verifiability, secret sharing homomorphisms, and multiplicative properties of our schemes. Our conclusions are presented in the last section.
In the rest of this section we present first some basic facts on number theory. For more details, the reader is referred to [8] .
Let a, b ∈ Z, b = 0. The quotient of integer division of a by b will be denoted by a div b and the remainder will be denoted by a mod b. In the case a mod b = 0 we will say that b is a divisor of a and denote this by b|a.
Let a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z, a 2 1 + · · · + a 2 n = 0. The greatest common divisor (gcd) of a 1 , . . . , a n will be denoted by (a 1 , . . . , a n ). It is well-known that there exist α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ Z that satisfy α 1 a 1 + · · · + α n a n = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) (the linear form of the gcd).
Let a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ Z such that a 1 · · · a n = 0. The least common multiple (lcm) of a 1 , . . . , a n will be denoted by [a 1 , . . . , a n ]. For a given sequence of integers m 1 , . . . , m n and for a set A ∈ P({1, . . . , n}) 1 , the least common multiple of the elements m i , for i ∈ A, will be also denoted by [A] .
Z m is the set {0, 1, . . . , m − 1}, Z * m stands for the set {a ∈ Z m |(a, m) = 1} and φ(m) denotes the cardinality of the set Z * m , for all m ≥ 2. Let a, b, m ∈ Z. We say that a and b are congruent modulo m, and we use the notation a ≡ b mod m, if m|(a − b). It is easy to see that a mod b ≡ a mod m, for any a, b, m ∈ Z such that m|b.
For an element a ∈ Z * m , the order of a modulo m, i.e., the least non-zero positive integer k such that a k ≡ 1 mod m will be denoted by ord m (a). It is well-known that the relation a i ≡ a j mod m is equivalent with i ≡ j mod ord m (a), for any integers i and j. A primitive root modulo m is an element a ∈ Z * m such that ord m (a) = φ(m). The Chinese remainder theorem has many applications in computer science (see, for example, [13] ). We only mention its applications to the RSA decryption algorithm as proposed by Quisquater and Couvreur [27] , the discrete logarithm algorithm as proposed by Pohlig and Hellman [26] , and the algorithm for recovering the secret in the Mignotte's threshold secret sharing scheme [22] or in its generalization [19] , or in the Asmuth-Bloom threshold secret sharing scheme [1] . Several versions of the Chinese remainder theorem have been proposed. The next one is called the general Chinese remainder theorem [24] :
The system of equations
if the above system of equations has solutions in Z, then it has an unique solution in
When (m i , m j ) = 1, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, one gets the standard version of the Chinese remainder theorem. Garner [17] found an efficient algorithm for this case and Fraenkel [16] extended it to the general case. We present next some basic facts about secret sharing schemes. Let n be an integer, n ≥ 2 and A ⊆ P({1, 2, . . . , n}). Informally, an A-secret sharing scheme is a method of generating (S, (I 1 , . . . , I n )) such that -for any A ∈ A, the problem of finding the element S, given the set {I i | i ∈ A} is "easy"; -for any A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) \ A, the problem of finding the element S, given the set {I i | i ∈ A} is intractable.
The set A will be referred to as the authorized access structure or simply as the access structure, S will be referred to as the secret and I 1 , . . . , I n will be referred to as the shares (or the shadows) of S. The elements of the set A will be referred to as the authorized access sets of the scheme. A natural 2 condition is that an access structure A is monotone, i.e.,
Any monotone access structure A is well specified by the set of the minimal authorized access sets, i.e., the set A min = {A ∈ A|(∀B ∈ A \ {A})(¬B ⊆ A)}. Also, the unauthorized access structure A, A = P({1, 2, . . . , n}) \ A, is well specified by the set of the maximal unauthorized access sets, i.e., the set A max = {A ∈ A|(∀B ∈ A \ {A})(¬A ⊆ B)}.
In our paper we consider only monotone access structures A that also satisfy the condition (∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n})(∃A ∈ A min : i ∈ A) because, in case there is an i such that the mentioned property does not hold, we may consider the set {1, 2, . . . , n}\{i}. In this case, n will be referred to as the size of the access structure.
An important particular class of secret sharing schemes is that of the threshold secret sharing schemes. In these schemes, only the cardinality of the sets of shares is important for recovering the secret. More exactly, if the required threshold is k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the minimal access structure is A min = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k}. In this case, an A-secret sharing scheme will be referred to as a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem
We briefly present next the most important threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem.
Mignotte's Threshold Secret Sharing scheme
Mignotte's threshold secret sharing scheme [22] uses special sequences of integers, referred to as the Mignotte sequences.
Definition 1. Let n be an integer, n ≥ 2, and 2 ≤ k ≤ n. An (k, n)-Mignotte sequence is a sequence of positive integers m 1 < · · · < m n such that (m i , m j ) = 1, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, and m n−k+2 · · · m n < m 1 · · · m k .
Given an (k, n)-Mignotte sequence, the scheme works as follows:
-The secret S is chosen as a random integer such that β < S < α, where α = m 1 · · · m k and β = m n−k+2 · · · m n ; -The shares I i are chosen by I i = S mod m i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n; -Given k distinct shares I i 1 , . . . , I i k , the secret S is recovered using the standard Chinese remainder theorem, as the unique solution modulo
A generalization of Mignotte's scheme by allowing modules that are not necessarily pairwise coprime was proposed in [19] , by introducing generalized Mignotte sequences.
Definition 2. Let n be an integer, n ≥ 2, and 2 ≤ k ≤ n. A generalized (k, n)-Mignotte sequence is a sequence m 1 , . . . , m n of positive integers such that
It is easy to see that every (k, n)-Mignotte sequence is a generalized (k, n)-Mignotte sequence. Moreover, if we multiply every element of an (k, n)-Mignotte sequence by a fixed element δ ∈ Z, (δ, m 1 · · · m n ) = 1, we obtain a generalized (k, n)-Mignotte sequence. Generalized Mignotte's scheme works like Mignotte's scheme,
Moreover, in this case, the general Chinese remainder theorem must be used for recovering the secret.
Asmuth-Bloom Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
This scheme, proposed by Asmuth and Bloom in [1] , uses special sequences of integers. More exactly, a sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers r, m 1 
Given such a sequence, the scheme works as follows:
-The secret S is chosen as a random element of the set Z r ; -The shares I i are chosen by I i = (S + γ · r) mod m i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where γ is an arbitrary integer such that S + γ · r ∈ Z m 1 ···m k ; -Given k distinct shares I i 1 , . . . , I i k , the secret S can be obtained as S = x 0 mod r, where x 0 is obtained, using the standard Chinese remainder theorem, as the unique solution modulo
The sequences used in the Asmuth-Bloom scheme can be generalized by allowing modules that are not necessarily pairwise coprime in an obvious manner. We can use any sequence r, m 1 , · · · , m n such that
It is easy to see that if we multiply every element of an ordinary Asmuth-Bloom sequence excepting r with a fixed element δ ∈ Z, (δ, m 1 · · · m n ) = 1, we obtain a generalized Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
The application of the Chinese remainder theorem in threshold secret sharing has been also discussed in [18] and a unitary point of view on the security of the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem was presented in [28] . Although the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem are not perfect 3 , by choosing carefully the parameters, these schemes can lead to a reasonable factor security size of shares .
General Secret Sharing Schemes
There are situations which require more complex access structures than the threshold ones. Shamir [30] discussed the case of sharing a secret between the executives of a company such that the secret can be recovered by any three executives, or by any executive and any vice-president, or by the president alone. This is an example of the so-called hierarchical secret sharing schemes. The Shamir's solution for this case is based on an ordinary (3, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme. Thus, the president receives three shares, each vice-president receives two shares and, finally, every simple executive receives a single share.
The above idea leads to the so-called weighted (or multiple shares based) threshold secret sharing schemes. In these schemes, the shares are pairwise disjoint 4 sets of shares provided by an ordinary threshold secret sharing scheme. Benaloh and Leichter have proven in [3] that there are access structures that can not be realized using such schemes. We present next their example that proves this. Example 1. Let n = 4 and A min = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Suppose that this access structure can be realized using a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme based on an ordinary threshold secret sharing scheme with threshold k, and let a, b, c and, respectively, d be the numbers of shares used. So, a+b ≥ k and c+d ≥ k. If we sum these inequalities we obtain a + b + c + d ≥ 2k, and, further, 2 · max(a, b) + 2 · max(c, d) ≥ 2k which leads to max(a, b)+max(c, d) ≥ k. Thus, one of the sets {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3} or {2, 4} is an authorized access set! We present next the most important general secret sharing techniques.
Ito-Saito-Nishizeki Scheme
Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [21] have introduced the so-called cumulative array technique for monotone access structures.
Definition 3. Let A be a monotone authorized access structure of size n and let B 1 , . . . , B m be the corresponding maximal unauthorized access sets. The cumulative array for the access structure A, denoted by C A , is the n × m matrix,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
Let consider now an arbitrary (m, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme with the secret S and the corresponding shadows s 1 , . . . , s m . In the A-secret sharing scheme, the shadows I 1 , . . . , I n corresponding to the secret S will be defined as 
Benaloh-Leichter Scheme
Benaloh and Leichter [3] have represented the access structures using formulae. More exactly, for a monotone authorized access structure A of size n, they defined the set F A as the set of formulae on a set of variables {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } such that for every F ∈ F A , the interpretation of F with respect to an assignation of the variables is true if and only if the true variables correspond to a set A ∈ A. They have remarked that such formulae can be used as templates for describing how a secret can be shared with respect to the given access structure. Because the formulae can be expressed using only ∧ operators and ∨ operators, it is sufficient to indicate how to "split" the secret across these operators.
Thus, we can inductively define the shares of a secret S with respect to a formulae F as follows
where, for the case
we can use any (k, k)-threshold secret sharing scheme for deriving some shares s 1 , . . . , s k corresponding to the secret S and, finally, the shares as I i = {s|(s, i) ∈ Shares(S, F )}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where F is an arbitrary formula in the set F A .
Example 3. Let n = 3 and an authorized access structure A given by A min = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. For example, the formula
is in the set F A . In this case Shares(S, F ), for some secret S, can be obtained as
where s 1 , s 2,1 and, respectively, s 2,2 , s 3 are shadows of the secret S with respect to two arbitrary (2, 2)-threshold secret schemes. Thus, the shares corresponding to the secret S with respect to the access structure A are I 1 = {s 1 }, I 2 = {s 2,1 , s 2,2 } and I 2 = {s 3 }.
Remark 1.
A shadow I i may contain many sub-shadows, one sub-shadow for every minimal access set to which i belongs. Thus, an ordering of these sub-shadows is required in order to select the correct sub-shadow corresponding to a certain access set in the reconstruction phase.
Remark 2. Benaloh and Leichter also proposed using general threshold k,m operators 5 in order to construct smaller formulae, reducing in this way the size of the shadows. In this case, the definition of Shares(S, F ) can be extended for these operators as follows: (F 1 , . . . , F m ) , where s 1 , . . . , s m are the shadows corresponding to the secret S with respect to an arbitrary (k, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
Example 4. Let n = 4 and a monotone authorized access structure A given by A min = {{2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. For example, the formula
is in the set F A . Using the threshold operator, we can obtain a shorter formula, namely, (
General Secret Sharing Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem
We indicate how we can extend the threshold secret schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem to more general access structures. For simplicity, we only deal with the Mignotte's scheme, but we must mention that this extension technique can be also applied to Asmuth-Bloom scheme. We first extend the (generalized) threshold Mignotte sequences in a natural manner.
Definition 4. Let n be a positive integer, n ≥ 2 and A an authorized access structure. An A-Mignotte sequence is a sequence m 1 , . . . , m n of positive integers such that
Remark 3. The above property is equivalent with
Remark 4. If A is specified by A min = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k} then any A-Mignotte sequence is a generalized (k, n)-Mignotte sequence in sense of Definition 2. Moreover, for the same access structure, any ordered A-Mignotte sequence with pairwise coprime elements is a (k, n)-Mignotte sequence in sense of Definition 1. Example 6. (with artificial small parameters) Let A min = {{1}, {2, 3}}. We use the sequence from Example 5. Thus, the secret S will be generated in the interval [5, 15] . For example, we consider S = 13. The shares will be I 1 = S mod m 1 = 13, I 2 = S mod m 2 = 1 and I 3 = S mod m 3 = 3. The sets {I 1 } or {I 2 , I 3 } will lead to the secret S, but the set {I 2 } will lead only to S ≡ 1 mod 3.
Remark 5. It is interesting to see that some access structures can not be realized using sequences of pairwise coprime numbers and, thus, the general Chinese remainder theorem must be used. For example, for the access structure A given by A min = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, there is no A-Mignotte sequence with pairwise coprime elements, because, otherwise, the condition 
Capabilities of the Presented Scheme
In this section we discuss some interesting aspects of the proposed scheme like verifiability, secret sharing homomorphisms and multiplicative properties. These notions have been introduced for the threshold secret sharing schemes, but they can be extended to the general case in a natural manner. Moreover, we shall also show how to use these properties in electronic voting or in threshold cryptography.
Verifiability
In practice, the secret and the shares are generated by an administrator (or dealer) which must be a mutually trusted party. Afterwards, the administrator securely distributes the shares to the users. The verifiable secret sharing schemes (see, for example, [7] , [15] , [25] ) can detect, with some probability, a dishonest behavior of the administrator or of some users in the reconstructing phase. This feature is very important, for example, in e-voting protocols based on secret sharing schemes.
In our case, we shall use that, if I 1 , . . . , I n represent correct shares of a secret S, then S ≡ I i mod m i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Such a congruence is equivalent with α S i ≡ α
i mod p i , for any positive integer p i and any element α i ∈ Z * p i of order m i (m i must be a divisor of φ(p i )).
The administrator makes public the values (p i , α i , α S,i ), where α S,i = α S i mod p i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and sends securely I 1 , . . . , I n to users.
The i th user, after receiving I i , can verify that his share is correct by computing α I i i mod p i and comparing the result with α S,i . Moreover, the integrity of the shares is also assured. The security of this new feature of our secret sharing scheme is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
Secret Sharing Homomorphisms
Benaloh introduced the notion of secret sharing homomorphisms in [2] .
Definition 5. Let D secret and D shares be the set of possible secrets and, respectively, the set of possible shares. Consider two binary operations ⊕ and ⊗ over D secret and, respectively, D shares . We say that an A-secret sharing scheme is (⊕, ⊗)− homomorphic if for any S 1 , S 2 ∈ D secret with the corresponding shares (I 1 1 , . . . , I 1 n ), and respectively, (I 2 1 , . . . , I 2 n ), the shares (I 1 1 ⊗I 2 1 , . . . , I 1 n ⊗I 2 n ) correspond to the secret
Our secret sharing scheme provides some partial secret sharing homomorphisms in the following sense. Consider D secret = {β + 1, . . . , α − 1}, D shares = Z and a binary operation ∈ {+, −, ·} over Z. The extended Mignotte secret sharing scheme is partially ( , ) − homomorphic, in the sense that, for any S 1 , S 2 ∈ D secret with the corresponding shares (I 1 1 , . . . , I 1 n ), respectively, (I 2 1 , . . . , I 2 n ), the shares 6 (I 1 1 6 In the extended Mignotte scheme, the shares are chosen as Ii = S mod mi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, but any integers Ii with Ii ≡ (S mod mi) mod mi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, will work.
I 2 1 , . . . , I 1 n I 2 n ) correspond to the secret S 1 S 2 , providing that S 1 S 2 ∈ D secret . Moreover, if S is a secret with the corresponding shares (I 1 , . . . , I n ) and f is a polynomial function with integer coefficients such that f (S) ∈ D secret then the shares (f (I 1 ) , . . . , f (I n )) correspond to the secret f (S). All these properties result from the corresponding properties of the congruences.
An E-voting Scheme
We propose an e-voting scheme based on these properties, following an idea from [2] . More exactly, we address to the case of yes/no e-voting. Any voting server deals with a group of at most m voters and each server is divided in n subservers, for some n ≥ 2. The central voting server decides on an authorized access structure A of size n and generates an A-Mignotte sequence with a large factor α−β β . A secret value value yes ∈ {β + 1, . . . , α − 1} is assigned to a yes vote and a secret value value no ∈ {β + 1, . . . , α − 1} is assigned to a no vote.
Each voter securely obtains the secret value yes or value no corresponding to his yes or no vote using any oblivious transfer technique and distributes the corresponding shares to the n subservers. Each subserver can verify the consistency of the received share using the technique described in Section 5.1. Each subserver computes the sum of the incoming shares and, at the end of voting, sends the result to the central voting server. By the partial (+, +)-homomorphism property of the extended Mignotte secret sharing scheme, the sums of shares are shares of the sum of the secrets. The values value yes and value no must satisfy m · max(value yes , value no ) < α. Thus, the central voting server can obtain the final sum by using the sums of shares from any trusted authorized subservers.
Moreover, if the values value yes and value no satisfy m · value yes < value no , then the correct numbers of yes and no votes can be obtained as the unique solutions of the equation value yes · x + value no · y = f inal sum, or, more exactly, as follows: number votes no = f inal sum div value no , number votes yes = (f inal sum mod value no ) div value yes .
Multiplicative Aspects
The multiplicative threshold secret sharing schemes were introduced in [11] . We present here a slight modification of the definition given in the mentioned paper.
Definition 6. Let D secret be the set of possible secrets, D shares be the set of possible shares and consider an associative and commutative binary operation over D secret . We say that an A-secret sharing scheme is multiplicative with respect to if for any set A ∈ A there is a family of public functions (
This property of secret sharing schemes can be used in designing threshold cryptographic primitives. We show that the extended Mignotte secret sharing scheme can be used for this purpose. More exactly, we indicate how our secret sharing scheme can be combined with ElGamal decryption in order to obtain threshold decryption. Our proposal follows an idea from [12] .
We shall first present the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [14] . The public key is (p, α, β) where p is a large prime, α is a primitive root modulo p, β = α a mod p and a ∈ Z p−1 is the private key. A message x ∈ Z p is encrypted by a pair (γ, δ) where γ = α l mod p, δ = x · β l mod p and l ∈ Z p−1 is a parameter chosen by the sender. The legal receiver can obtain the message x by computing γ −a · δ mod p.
The administrator decides on an authorized access structure A of size n, for some n ≥ 2, and generates an A-Mignotte sequence with a large factor α−β β such that β < a < α. The private key a will be the secret and the shares I 1 , . . . , I n will be securely distributed to the users U 1 , . . . , U n . Consider now an authorized access set A. Using the Ore's construction [24] for obtaining the solution of the corresponding system of modular equations (see also [19] ), the secret a can be expressed as We return to the decryption operation for ElGamal cryptosystem. Suppose that a group of users {U i | i ∈ A}, for some authorized access set A, want to decrypt a message (γ, δ). If they individually compute the elements In [20] we have combined the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the general Chinese remainder theorem with the RSA cryptosystem [29] in order to get threshold decryption or signature generation. This technique can be extended to more general access structures in an obvious manner.
Conclusions
We have extended the threshold secret schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem in order to address more general access structures. We have also shown that some access structures can not be realized using only sequences of pairwise coprime numbers and, thus, the general Chinese remainder theorem must be used. We have further presented some interesting aspects of these schemes like verifiability, secret sharing homomorphisms and multiplicative properties and we have also showed how to exploit these properties in e-voting or in threshold cryptography.
An interesting open problem is to characterize the access structures that can be realized using the proposed schemes. Another interesting problem is the problem to efficiently generate extended Mignotte sequences with a large factor α−β β . We shall consider these problems in our future work.
